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1. Introduction
In the hot summer of  2018, in the midst of  the migrant crisis, a series of  tweets from 
Italian government officials announced the closure of  national ports to refugee rescue 
ships. This digital statement was repeated as a mantra in television news, on the radio, 
and in newspapers. Italian people had the impression that the executive had ordered 
the closure of  Italian ports. Port authorities and the coast guard, despite frictions 
and mutual misunderstandings, seemed to eventually follow this orientation conveyed 
through a series of  tweets. Short sequences of  words interspersed with some hash-
tags and published on a private platform from the personal accounts of  various gov-
ernment officials de facto acquired a legal value equal, if  not greater, to that of  any 
ministerial decree.
This paper does not intend to discuss the merits of  the complex issue of  managing 
migrants in Europe. Instead, it aims to analyse from a legal point of  view the relation-
ship between social media and politics, specifically illustrating how the use of  social 
media as a communication tool by politicians can have a profound impact on the ex-
ercise of  our fundamental rights. In particular, the central question on which I would 
like to focus in this brief  paper is: what is the legal value of  a message, for example 
a tweet, published on social media by a person holding a political-institutional role?
2. Italian case-law: The Bray case
Italian case-law has rarely analysed issues related to social media, but there is one 
precedent specifically dealing with the question presented above. In 2015, the fourth 
chamber of  the Council of  State held that a minister’s tweet cannot be considered an 
administrative act and that, therefore, cannot be a source of  abuse of  power.1 A Ligu-
rian municipality had approved an intervention to redevelop a part of  the historic cen-
tre that was protected as a cultural asset. It requested and was granted authorization to 
start the works from the local cultural heritage office. However, some environmental 
1  Council of  State, VI division, 12 February 2015, no. 769.
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and citizens’ associations began a protest as the redevelopments would have involved 
the demolition of  some characteristic trees.
The media hype raised by the dispute came to the attention of  national news to the 
point of  arousing the personal interest of  the then Minister for Cultural Heritage, 
Massimo Bray. The minister, tweeting from his personal Twitter account, asked the 
municipality to suspend the works. The local cultural heritage office decided to fol-
low the advice expressed through the minister’s tweet, and invited the municipality 
to suspend the part of  the redevelopment works which was subject to contestation. 
The municipality then decided to appeal the suspension order before the regional ad-
ministrative court. One of  the points of  the appeal concerned precisely the tweet in 
question: according to the applicant, the Minister would have intervened in a matter 
removed from his competence, giving rise to a situation of  abuse of  power.
The regional administrative court held that, although the Minister’s tweets cannot 
be regarded as an administrative act that can be invalidated due to incompetence, 
they nevertheless constitute an evidence of  abuse of  power.2 At the appeal stage, the 
Council of  State reaffirmed that administrative acts must satisfy specific formal crite-
ria, especially in an era characterised by new technologies and methods to communi-
cate.3 Therefore, according to Italian administrative judges, communication through 
social media by representatives of  public institutions, especially if  it is carried out via 
their personal profile or account, does not constitute an administrative act and, there-
fore, it cannot legally affect citizens’ legal status.
3. Comparative perspectives: The Trump cases
Very similar conclusions, although starting from diametrically opposite assumptions, 
seem to have been reached also overseas, in the context of  a dispute arisen from 
three tweets posted by US President Donald Trump in 2017. As known, the current 
president of  the United States of  America is a prolific Twitter user. His predecessor 
Barack Obama was considered the first “social media president”, having tweeted for 
the first time in 2007 and having established the official account of  the president of  
the United States @POTUS in 2015.4 Trump, however, despite having inherited the 
presidential account login credentials from Obama, has always continued to use his 
personal Twitter ID @RealDonaldTrump.
On 26th July 2017, President Trump tweeted: «After Consultation with My Generals 
and Military Experts, Please Be Advised That the United States Government Will Not 
Accept or Allow.....» «....Transgender Individuals to Serve in Any Capacity in the U.S. 
Military. Our Military Must Be Focused on Decisive and Overwhelming.....» «....Victo-
ry and Cannot Be Burdened with the Tremendous Medical Costs and Disruption That 
2  Regional Administrative Tribunal of  Liguria, I division, 19 May 2014, no. 787.
3  Council of  State, decision no. 769/2015, cit.
4  See A. Acker – A. Kriesberg, Tweets May Be Archived: Civic Engagement, Digital Preservation and Obama 
White House Social Media Data, in Proceedings of  the Association for Information Science and 
Technology, 54(1), 2017, 1 ss.
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Transgender in the Military Would Entail. Thank You».5
In 2015, the Obama administration had started a process of  gradual revision of  poli-
cies relating to the admission and service of  transgender military personnel.6 In 2016, 
then US defence secretary Ash Carter allowed transgender soldiers to serve in the 
army in an “open” way.7 In June 2017, the recruitment procedures for transgender 
individuals in the army were to officially begin, an operation however first postponed, 
and then definitively suspended due to direct intervention by President Trump.
Following the publication of  the three tweets quoted above, several transgender sol-
diers sued the President for violating the principle of  non-discrimination enshrined 
in the Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution.8 These tweets, therefore, al-
though published by Trump from his personal account @RealDonaldTrump, were 
perceived as an official order of  the President, having a legally binding value in par-
ticular vis-à-vis military hierarchies, subject in the US legal system to the direct guid-
ance of  the President, in his capacity of  commander in chief  of  the armed forces.9
The first comments on the legal nature of  the President’s tweets that appeared in 
American newspapers underlined the differences between a formal order of  the head 
of  state and his externalisation on social media, concluding that the latter could not 
claim to assume any legally binding value.10 An analysis subsequently published in 
the Harvard Law Review took a more nuanced approach.11 In contrast to the Italian 
Council of  State, assuming that the orders of  the president of  the United States are 
legally binding whatever form they take, the article explained how Trump’s tweets 
satisfy both the publicity and competence requirements, which are the only criteria 
necessary to evaluate the validity of  a presidential order. Little, if  anything, would then 
be the difference between a tweet and a presidential memorandum at the content lev-
el, both being purely political communication tools. The article therefore concluded 
that the legal value of  a tweet depends on the intrinsically dynamic “legal culture” of  
the executive in power. Secretary Mattis’ decision not to immediately follow Trump’s 
tweets shows that the informality of  the current President is not yet recognized and 
fully subscribed to at the executive level, but that perhaps - the article does not seem 
to exclude it - it will be in future.
On the one hand, decreeing via Twitter allows the president to circumvent the mini-
mal guarantees required in terms of  preliminary consultation about the decision and 
does not offer the possibility of  fully developing any motivations or of  accompanying 
5  D.J Trump (@realDonaldTrump) tweets posted on 26 July 2017, available here, here and here.
6  See US Secretary of  Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of  the Military Departments - Subject: Transgender 
Service Members (28 July 2015), accessed 28 May 2019.
7  US Secretary of  Defense, Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 16-005, “Military Service of  Transgender 
Service Members (30 June 2016), accessed 28 May 2019.
8  Doe v Trump, Civil Action No 2017-1597 (DDC 2018).
9  See D. Luban, On the Commander-In-Chief  Power, in Southern California Law Review, 81, 2008, 477 ss.
10  See J.S. Gersen, Trump’s Tweeted Transgender Ban Is Not a Law, in New Yorker, 27 July 2017, accessed 
28 May 2019.
11  Recent Social Media Posts. Executive Power - Presidential Directives - In Tweets, President Purports 
to Ban Transgender Servicemembers. - Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (July 26, 2017, 
5:55–6:08 AM), in Harvard Law Review, 131, 2018, 934 ss.
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the decision with further guidelines. However, on the other hand, this form of  digital 
ordering eases the formalities linked to the publication of  the decision and shortens 
the distance with the citizen by ultimately increasing the level of  transparency of  the 
executive. From a pragmatic point of  view, therefore, especially when transparency 
and contact with the electorate are core objectives for the government, decreeing via 
Twitter would not be a solution to be discarded, provided that the executive in power 
is sufficiently open to recognise its political and legal value.
While not excluding this last option, the aforementioned article published in the Har-
vard Law Review refers in the conclusion to two fundamental problems that would 
emerge if  the legal binding nature of  the presidential tweets were recognized. Firstly, 
Twitter, unlike official publication channels, would allow the president to eliminate, at 
his discretion, the tweet-decree: hence the problem of  order stability. Secondly, Twit-
ter would allow the president to limit access to his tweets, by ‘blocking’ unwelcomed 
users: hence the question of  publicity of  decisions. These aspects are linked to the pe-
culiar architecture of  Twitter as a medium chosen to transmit the orders of  the Pres-
ident and it is interesting to note that both profiles have been the subject of  recent 
legislative and judicial initiatives concerning the use of  Twitter by President Trump.
In 2017, Democratic Representative Mike Quigley introduced a bill to Congress to 
amend the Presidential Records Act 1978, the legislation regulating the archiving of  
documents relating to the activity of  the President of  the United States.12 The propos-
al aimed to impose an obligation to archive all the tweets of  the President, without ex-
cluding those published through his personal account, as dictated by the legislation in 
force. The bill was mockingly titled COVFEFE Act, a name that intentionally evokes 
one of  the most famous typos tweeted by Trump, but that would actually be the ac-
ronym for Communications Over Various Feeds Electronically for Engagement Act. 
The amendment promoted by Quigley could pose remedy to two related problems. 
Firstly, it would ensure the stability of  presidential tweets, which, once published, even 
if  subsequently deleted by the president, would in any case be available in the state 
archives. Secondly, it would recognise the value of  the tweets issued by the president 
through his personal account, abandoning a formalist approach and evaluating with 
pragmatism the actual use by the president of  his social media channels. It should in 
fact be remembered that, in the specific case of  President Trump, the official Twitter 
account @POTUS plays a secondary role. Through the @RealDonaldTrump profile, 
the President himself  announces official news, including relevant government direc-
tives, often - as we have just seen - before the White House press office.
4. Digital exclusion and fundamental rights
In light of  this observation, one can guess the basic question that gave rise to an-
other court case involving President Trump.13 The President has elevated a personal 
12  M. Quigley, H.R.2884 - 115th Congress (2017-2018): COVFEFE Act of  2017, 12 June 2017, accessed 
8 April 2019.
13  Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University et al v Donald J Trump et al [2018] US District 
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communication tool, managed by a private company, to the rank of  official contact 
point with citizens. Trump, by preferring Twitter as a means of  transmitting his of-
ficial messages, effectively neutralizes a series of  guarantees that instead characterize 
traditional political communication procedures. First of  all, that of  publicity. The pri-
vatization of  political communication entails new rules of  the game: for example, on 
Twitter, President Trump may, at his convenience, “block” unwanted followers, what 
elsewhere I have called ‘digital exclusion’, and which may even take on the character 
of  an afflictive ‘digital punishment’.
In 2017, seven individuals blocked by the President from his personal profile, along 
with Columbia University’s Knight First Amendment Institute, sued Trump, his social 
media manager and the White House press office manager. The first seven applicants 
complained that, having been blocked, they had not had the opportunity to read and, 
above all, to interact - commenting, retweeting, linking - with the tweets published by 
Trump. The Knight Institute, instead, claimed to have been deprived of  the poten-
tial comments that the seven co-applicants could have published had they not been 
blocked.
District judge Naomi Reice Buchwald, in her ruling of  23rd May 2018, confirmed 
on appeal on 9th July 2019, ordered the President to “unblock” the seven individu-
als. Citing the Packingham case,14 the federal judge recalled how social networks today 
represent one of  the most important spaces for the exchange of  opinions. Although 
Twitter is a private platform, President Trump would have de facto designated it as 
a “public forum” to interact with the other citizens. By blocking a number of  users 
based on their political orientation, President Trump violated the First Amendment to 
the American Constitution, which protects freedom of  speech. Blocked users, in fact, 
even if  they could continue to have access to Trump’s tweets through some tricks, 
would not have in any way the possibility to interact directly with the presidential 
tweets, for example by commenting on them.
5. Conclusion
To conclude, one can observe that the progressive shift of  the centre of  gravity of  
political communication from traditional means to social media is accompanied by an 
ever-increasing level of  interactivity. At the time of  Twitter, even the ordinary citizen 
can directly comment on a message from the President of  the United States. One-way 
communication channels are thus gradually replaced by a complex space of  interac-
tion involving a plurality of  social actors: a public forum – as it would be said in the 
United States. Replying to a tweet written by the President of  the United States does 
not only mean engaging in a conversation with a prominent political figure, but also 
implies taking part in a virtual debate involving a boundless audience of  other citi-
Court, Southern District of  New York 17 Civ. 5205; Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University 
v. Trump [2019] 2d Cir. No. 18-1691.
14  Packingham v North Carolina [2017] US Supreme Court 582 U.S. ___; see E. Celeste, Packingham v 
North Carolina: A Constitutional Right to Social Media?, in Cork Online Law Review, 17, 2018, 116 ss.
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zens, who can read and, in turn, comment on the tweets. All the more reason why, as 
Judge Buchwald pointed out, even the President of  the United States, even if  he uses 
his own personal Twitter account, cannot block other users. He can ignore them, for 
example ‘muting’ them. But if  politics chooses to expose itself  to the virtual arena, it 
must do so completely, without evading criticism and by respecting the fundamental 
rights of  others.
